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Conflict, militarisation, human rights
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
What is the
risk of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline causing greater conflict
and bloodshed?
Given that the pipeline route passes through or near seven
different war-zones, will BP find itself at some point in the next
40 years caught up in a conflict, a conflict inflamed by its own
activities? Will the state-led militarisation, which will be imposed
to secure the pipelines system, contribute in the long-term to political
instability, and diminish regional security? Will BP become associated
with human rights violations carried out by its associates and allies
to protect the pipelines system?
(Much of the material on this page
is drawn from ‘Caspian
oil on the east-west crossroad’,
by Saulius Piksrys, CEE Bankwatch network, Lithuania, December 2001
Militarisation in the Caspian region
The BTC pipeline passes just 10
miles from Nagorno-Karabakh, the area of Azerbaijan occupied by
Armenia, where a bloody conflict killed at least 25,000 people and
created at least a million refugees.
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It passes through Georgia, which remains unstable, with
separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – movements
which the Georgian government tried to violently suppress
during the 1990s.
Just across the border into Russia, and still only 70 miles
from the BTC pipeline route, the horrific conflict in Chechnya
continues. The region also saw related conflict in neighbouring
Dagestan in 1999, and fighting between the Russian republics
of North Ossetia and Ingushetia in 1992.
In Turkey, the BTC route passes through the edge of the area
of the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), now known as Kongra-Gel, where recently a fragile ceasefire was broken off.
[more info on these conflicts] |

The village of Hacibayram, just 2 miles from the pipeline route
- evicted during the brutal war between the Turkish state and
the Kurdish PKK [Greg Muttitt / PLATFORM] |
Against this background of persistent conflict,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are heavily – and increasingly – militarised.
Due to the unresolved conflict with Armenia, Azerbaijan still keeps
strong armed forces, consuming an important share of its budget.
Chinese and Russian support of Armenia has led Azerbaijan to seek
military co-operation with the West and Islamic countries.
In January 2003, the Oil and Gas Journal reported that Azerbaijan's Defence Minister Safar Abiyev told British government officials that Armenia's "aggressive policy" posed an "actual threat" to security in the region, including the BTC pipeline. Arms and hardware accumulated by Armenia pose a serious threat to the BTC pipeline that should be eliminated, Abyev told Britain's Ambassador Andrew Tucker and its military attaché, Christopher John Nunn.
Georgia’s security is threatened by its
location just south of the strife-torn Russian republics, including
Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, and also from within by an conflict
with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Turkey has a substantial military capacity, military expenditure
accounting for an enormous 5.6 per cent of GDP. Many soldiers are
deployed in Kurdish regions. As recently as May 2002, Turkish security
forces, backed by warplanes and attack helicopters, attacked the
Kurdish Tunceli region, which the BTC pipeline skirts.
From 1987 until summer 2002, Tunceli remained under State of Emergency
rule, which allowed regional governors to exercise quasi-martial
law powers.
Russia and the Western powers have been growing increasingly competitive
in the south Caucasus region in the 1990s, but Azerbaijan and Georgia
have resisted Russian attempts to bring them more closely into security
arrangements of the Commonwealth of Independent States. After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan and Georgia became members of the
NATO-led ‘Partnership for Peace’ initiative, and have also integrated
into the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova regional
co-operation group, known as GUUAM. Turkey remains a key NATO member
and a strategic US ally; its airbases (including Incirlik, near
the end of the BTC oil pipeline – see chapter 3) are used
by the US for bombing raids against Iraq, and more recently Afghanistan.
Since 11th September 2001, Georgia and Azerbaijan have significantly
increased their cooperation with the USA. Both countries immediately
provided the USA with rights to fly over their territories for military
operations. In March 2002, the US Defense Department pledged US$
4.4 million in military aid to Azerbaijan with the reported aims
of countering terrorism, promoting stability in the Caucasus, and
developing trade and transport corridors.
But the most important US military interest in the region is in
Georgia. In February 2002, the US government said it would provide
Georgia with military support worth US$ 64 million, and promised
to dispatch 180 crack troops and to train up to 2,000 Georgians
in anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, chiefly in
the Pankisi Gorge, where Al Qaeda fighters (as well as Chechens)
are believed to have taken refuge. The pipeline route would pass
about 100 kilometres away from the Pankisi Gorge area.
Strong cultural and political links exist between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Turkish officers have served as advisers to the Azerbaijani armed
forces, and Turkey will reportedly modernise Azerbaijan's armed
forces within the framework of a new programme named ‘Arms in Exchange
for Gas’. Given the planned volumes of shipments of Azerbaijani
gas to Turkey, Baku could receive arms and military equipment to
the value of up to US$ 60 million over the next five years. Shipments
would then progressively increase after 2007 and could exceed $150-170
million.
In 2002, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an anti-terrorist
agreement with Turkey.
The Georgian Defence Minister also indicated that Georgia is interested
in sending officers to study in military schools in Azerbaijan.
Pipelines exacerbate tension
In developing countries, the construction and operation of pipelines
have often triggered further tensions, militarisation and conflicts
on a local scale. Because of the international nature of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
project, potential conflicts might develop also on a regional scale,
thus undermining the already weak stability of the region.
There is already evidence that some groups may be disposed to sabotage
the pipelines system. If these fears are realised, the human toll
could be devastating. Attacks are already being reported, in January 2003, the Baku-Supsa 'early oil' pipeline in Georgia was sabotaged, leading to a significant oil spill.
In July 2003, a report about the likelihood of a threat to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and acts of sabotage appeared on the Georgian Ministry of State Security web site. A little later, on the personal instruction of Minister of State Security Valeri Khaburdzania, the press service of the ministry confirmed the report. The report speaks about certain subversive groups which are likely to organize explosions at certain sections of the pipeline and the Ministry of State Security says that certain political interests are behind these possible actions. No specific groups were identified as behind the threat
In Turkey, the PKK has had a history of targeting oil installations.
During the height of their armed conflict with Turkish security
forces in the 1990s, the PKK identified Turkish pipelines and oil
refineries in the Kurdish regions as legitimate military targets.
In July 1991, PKK guerillas raided Turkish Petroleum’s (TPAO’s)
research camp in Kurtalan and blew up 15 vehicles. Five months later
in December 1991, the PKK destroyed TPAO’s Selmo oil wells near
the city of Batman with rocket fires. Then, in less than five weeks
between 31 August and 5 October 1992, the PKK attacked three different
pipeline sites in the Kurdish regions. First, on 31 August, Shell
Oil’s depots near the Kurdish stronghold of Diyarbakir, were attacked
and oil tanks were once again set on fire. Less than two weeks later,
on 12 September, the PKK raided the Selmo oilfields a second time,
setting fires and killing three engineers. Then, at the beginning
of October, the TPAO pumping stations and factories near Sason were
attacked and set on fire. In one of its most serious pipeline attacks
on 10 July 1996, the PKK set fire to part of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik
pipeline (Turkey-Iraq) in Silopi, Iraq. These fires could not be
controlled for days. Six months later, in January 1997, the PKK
attacked Kirkuk-Yumurtalik again, this time in the town of Mardin
in south-eastern Turkey.
However, in February 1999 the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was convicted of treason by the Turkish authorities and sentenced to death. This marked a turning point in the conflict.
A unilateral ceasefire throughout the period September 1999 – June 2004 by the PKK subsequently led to a great reduction in hostilities, and its strategy became one of pursuing Kurdish interests through non-violent, conventional political channels. However, the PKK, now known as Kongra-Gel, announced that the unilateral ceasefire would be called off with effect from 1 June 2004 . The reasons given for the resumption of violence was ongoing state military operations against the organisation's fighters. Although the conflict levels in the Southeast are not now approaching the pre-1999 situation, there have been widespread reports of an intensification in violence since June 2004 This resumption of violence does not bode well for the BTC pipeline as it passes directly through areas around Erzurum
where the PKK has been very active.
In Azerbaijan and Georgia the BTC pipeline would pass close to
Nagorno-Karabakh (15 kilometres), Abkhazia (130 kilometres) and
South Ossetia (55 kilometres), all of whom might consider themselves
enemies, respectively of Azerbaijan or Georgia: even if not now,
then quite possibly at some point within the next 40 years (the
planned lifetime of the BTC pipeline).
Pipeline militarisation
Meanwhile, there are clear indications of the host states’ plans
to militarise the region of the pipelines system, which would carry
grave risks for stability in the region and for human rights.
Since 1999, Georgia has already lined the Baku-Supsa 'early oil' pipeline with
military posts and has been conducting joint military exercises
with Azerbaijan to promote pipeline security.
On 3rd July 2001, BP Vice President John Sullivan and then Georgian
President Eduard Shevardnadze discussed security for the construction
and operation of the BTC oil and SCP gas pipelines. At the meeting,
they agreed to set up an inter-departmental commission with the
participation of law enforcement structures, which would guarantee
the security of the construction and operation of the oil and gas
pipelines. A few days before this meeting, President Shevardnadze
had publicly announced that the Georgian State Guard Service would
be responsible for the security of the transportation of Caspian
oil and gas resources through Georgia. He also revealed that a special
unit of the service had been policing the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline
for the past two years.
As the region has recently become further militarised following
September 11th 2001, US-led anti-terrorism initiatives
have been directly linked to the need to increase security along
the east-west energy corridor. In April 2002, Azerbaijan and Georgia
signed a new military agreement designed to increase oil and gas
pipeline security, alongside anti-terrorist and anti-separatism
efforts. At the end of the meeting, Ilham Aliyev - who was then the Vice President of the Azerbaijani
state-owned oil company SOCAR, and is now President of Azerbaijan, publicly admitted that the protection of the
BTC pipeline would involve the United States as well as Azerbaijan,
Turkey and Georgia.
Following increasing US deployment in Georgia in 2002, a BP spokeswoman
commented, "The pipelines will of course benefit from the military
presence", and in December 2002, the Georgian Times reported that NATO was considering creating a rapid response force to protect oil developments in the Caucasus.
The creation of a ‘militarised corridor’ along the pipelines’
route in Turkey’s Kurdish regions poses the serious threat of an
escalation in State violence in these war-ravaged regions. Responsibility
for the security of the pipeline in Turkey would rest with the Turkish
State Gendarmérie. Considering Turkey’s continued failure
to commit to serious human rights reform – most particularly, the
on-going impunity of those responsible for torture in custody and
extra-judicial killing – the increased militarisation that would
potentially accompany the development of the AGT pipelines could
also bring with it a massive blow to the cause of peace in Turkey.
The PKK has already reneged on their five-year cease-fire because of continued attacks and human rights violations meted out by the Turkish authorities and the possibility of a resolution to the conflict will not be aided by an increased military presence in
the Kurdish areas. Significantly, the Council
of Europe passed a highly critical resolution in July 2002, condemning
the severe and ongoing human rights abuses committed by Turkish
security forces and naming the Gendarméries as one of the
forces in urgent need of reform.
Human Rights:
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan continues to be run by an authoritarian regime and is still involved in the ongoing standoff with Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Human rights abuses and corruption continue with accusations of fraudulent practices in the presidential election of 2003, and the subsequent trials of Azerbaijani opposition leaders accused with instigating the violence that followed in 2004. These trials were branded as ‘unfair' by human rights observers.
Tensions are simmering in the country, no doubt stoked by the murder of a leading opposition journalist on the 2nd of March 2005 . Elmar Huseinov was killed in mysterious circumstances, leading some to believe that his murder was politically motivated. Freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is being curtailed, and the killing of Huseinov will surely compound the situation.
Recently, a student-led democratic movement has started to take shape in the form of the Orange Movement, clearly moulding themselves in the guise of their Ukrainian counterparts. However, the Aliyev administration has been quick to counter the movement, issuing orders to create pro-regime youth organizations across the country.
Georgia
Since the Rose revolution in 2003 which swept President Mikheil Saakashvili to power, a series of dubious developments have dented Georgia's democratization process. Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that torture still continues during pre-trial detention and that the administration has done little to prevent such practices. Evidence of corruption has also come to light with the plea-bargaining system. Defendants charged with crimes related to the old authoritarian regime, were freed upon payment of large sums of money to the State.
Ongoing tensions exist in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both are demanding independence from Georgia, but the Government in Tblisi refuse to acknowledge their demands for complete autonomy. Violence has flared up in South Ossetia within the past year, leading to fears of a repeat of the civil war which plagued the region in 1991-92. President Saakashvili unveiled his peace plan in January this year, but as of now the situation remains deadlocked. Likewise, the situation in Abkhazia teeters on a knifedge, with Tblisi's call for Abkhazia to accept federal status declined by Abkhazia's elected leader, Sergei Bagaph. Bagaph recently stated that he would seek closer ties with Russia to assure Abkhazia's autonomy, while Georgia's Defence Minister suggested that they may be planning to retake Abkhazia by force.
Turkey and the Kurds
Although the BTC pipeline does not pass through the predominantly
Kurdish regions of south-eastern Turkey, it passes through areas
of north-eastern Turkey where Kurds make up around 40 per cent of
the population. In these areas, the Turkish State has committed
gross human rights abuses, violently suppressing free expression,
and harassing and imprisoning democratically-elected Kurdish officials
and supporters of legally-registered, pro-Kurdish political parties.
Kurds in Turkey have for decades been subjected to gross human
rights violations and economic disadvantages. They bear the hallmarks
of systematic persecution from a State intent on destroying the
Kurdish identity by silencing the Kurdish language and other cultural
expressions through violence or censorship. Since the foundation
of the Turkish State in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, Turkey has refused to recognise the existence of a
separate Kurdish ethnic community within its borders. Officially,
under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, all inhabitants of Turkey were
defined as "Turkish": to define oneself as belonging to
any other ethnic group was regarded as an act of defiance against
State authority. In 1924, an official decree banned all Kurdish
schools, organisations and publications. Use of the words "Kurd"
and "Kurdistan" was forbidden and references to them were
removed from Turkish history books.
Over the course of the next decade, the newly established State
used brutal methods, including mass deportations, in an attempt
to pacify the rebellious Kurdish south-east of the country and to
try to assimilate the Kurds into the Turkish population forcibly.
In June 1934, Law 2510 divided Turkey into three zones: (i) localities
to be reserved for the habitation of persons possessing Turkish
culture; (ii) areas to which persons of non-Turkish culture could
be moved for assimilation into Turkish culture; and (iii) regions
for complete evacuation. At that stage, almost all Kurdish villages
were renamed with Turkish-sounding names. Parents could not register
their children with distinctively Kurdish names. The Kurdish language
was forbidden in written and spoken form. Kurdish folklore, music,
clothes and colours, and the celebration of the Kurdish new year
festival, Newroz, have all been banned at various times.
Today, more than 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, are still denied
basic human and cultural rights, and face the continuing horrors
of forced assimilation, involuntary displacement, repression and
human rights abuses. Beyond regular reports of the United Nations,
the Council of Europe, the US State Department’s Bureau of Human
Rights, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Turkey’s abysmal human rights record has been well-documented by
more than 300 judgments involving Turkey which have been handed
down by the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey’s record at the
European Court reveals it to be by far the Court’s worst offender
in cases that involve the most serious of human rights abuses including
extra-judicial killing, ‘disappearances’ and torture in custody.
One case that illustrates the continuing problems faced by Kurds in this region is that of Ferhat Kaya. Kaya is a prominent human rights defender and chairman of the Ardahan branch of the pro-Kurdish political party DEHAP. He has been at the forefront of pressing for proper compensation for those affected by the Baku-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Kaya was arrested for a second time on the 6 th May, 2004 following his attendance at meetings with those affected by the pipeline and later with trade unionists in Ardahan. On this occasion he was very badly beaten in custody by the police, and accused of being a terrorist. Witnesses stated they saw blood on his clothes and deep cuts on his arms following his first day in detention. He believes the arrest and torture are clearly connected to his work on the BTC pipeline. Human rights groups fear that this indicates a worsening climate of intimidation around the project.
Read the fact-finding mission report (678 KB)
Read the trial observation report (554 KB) for Ferhat Kaya's trial
Furthermore, on the 12th May 2005, the Turkish authorities were dealt another blow to their hopes of joining the European Union when the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the treatment of Abdullah Öcalan, the former leader of the PKK, was unfair and suggested a retrial.
Against this background of conflict and human rights abuses, we
must ask whether the passage of $40-50 million worth of oil through
the region every day will help or hinder the cause of peace.
Links on conflict in the Caucasus
CEE
Bankwatch Network - ‘Caspian oil on the east-west crossroad’:
paper on militarisation
Conciliation
Resources – Caucasus programme
FEWER
- Caucasus programme
Prof
Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics – expert on Caucasus,
oil and conflict
Map
of regional conflicts PDF
Links on human rights in the Caucasus and
Turkey
Amnesty
International – Azerbaijan
Amnesty
International – Georgia
Amnesty
International – Turkey
Human
Rights Watch – Azerbaijan
Human
Rights Watch – Georgia
Human
Rights Watch – Turkey
IHD
(Human Rights Association of Turkey)
Kurdish
Human Rights Project
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